Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium in scalar linear-state
  differential games with impulse control by Sadana, Utsav et al.
OPEN-LOOP AND FEEDBACK NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN SCALAR
LINEAR-STATE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH IMPULSE CONTROL
A PREPRINT
Utsav Sadana
Department of Decision Sciences
HEC Montréal
Montréal H3T 2A7, Canada
utsav.sadana@hec.ca
Puduru Viswanadha Reddy
Department of Electrical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology - Madras
Chennai 600 036, India
vishwa@ee.iitm.ac.in
Georges Zaccour
Department of Decision Sciences
HEC Montréal
Montréal H3T 2A7, Canada
georges.zaccour@gerad.ca
March 12, 2020
ABSTRACT
We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in
the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous,
we obtain the classical result in linear-state differential games that open-loop and feedback Nash
equilibria coincide. When the impulse instants are endogenous, we show that this result no longer
holds. In particular, the two equilibria are different. We show that the impulse level is a constant in
both equilibria. More importantly, in the open-loop case, we show that the equilibrium number of
impulses is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the feedback case.
Keywords Linear-state differential games · Impulse control · Quasi-variational inequalities · Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Recently, Sadana et al. (2019) considered a class of finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum linear-state differential
games, where one player uses an ordinary control,1 while the other intervenes only at some instants of time in the game,
that is, implements an impulse control. To illustrate, a game in which a firm continuously makes marketing, production,
and security decisions, and a hacker attacks the firm occasionally fits the model in Sadana et al. (2019). In the case
of one-dimensional linear-state differential games with impulse control, the authors showed that the open-loop Nash
equilibrium (OLNE) is unique and can admit at most one impulse.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it characterizes the feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE), which is conceptually
more attractive than its open-loop counterpart, in two different cases, namely, when the impulse instants are given and
when they are determined endogenously. A well-known result in the class of linear-state differential games (LSDGs)
with ordinary controls is that open-loop and feedback-Nash equilibria coincide (Dockner et al. (2000)). This implies
that a precommitment by the players to an action profile over time does not make them worse off than when they adapt
their strategies to the state of the system. Our second objective is to verify if this result still holds when one player uses
impulse strategies.
LSDGs have been extensively studied in the literature; see, e.g., Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999), Dockner et al. (2000),
Engwerda (2005), Haurie et al. (2012). Their popularity stems from their tractability, that is, the equilibrium strategies
and outcomes can be determined analytically. One drawback of this game class is that, by definition, the model cannot
include nonlinear terms in the state variables.2 However, the fact that there is no restriction on the form of the control
variables that enter the players’ objective functionals or the dynamics renders LSDGs appealing in some applications of
differential games (see Jørgensen et al. (2003), Jørgensen and Zaccour (2003)).
1We use the word “ordinary” to mean that player 1 uses control strategies that are piecewise continuous functions of time.
2It is possible to have a particular type of interaction between control and state variables and still retain the features of the class of
LSDGs (see Dockner et al. (2000)).
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In problems having one decision maker, impulse controls have been quite naturally used in instances involving a fixed
(or transaction) cost, as in, e.g., cash management (Constantinides and Richard (1978), Baccarin (2009)), portfolio
optimization (Korn (1998)), exchange rate intervention (Jeanblanc-Picqué (1993), Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999),
Bensoussan et al. (2012)), inventory control problems (Sulem (1986), Bensoussan et al. (2005)), and investment in
product quality (Reddy et al. (2016)). For a survey of applications of impulse control in management, see Bensoussan
and Tapiero (1982).
Impulse control has been introduced in zero-sum differential games to study different problems, e.g., pursuit evasion
(Chikrii et al. (2007)), option pricing ( Bernhard et al. (2006), El Farouq et al. (2010)), and pollution control (Ferrari
and Koch (2019)). For zero-sum impulse-control differentiable games with one player using an ordinary control,
and the other using an impulse control, see Zhang (2011), Azimzadeh (2019). In differential games with impulse
control, the player who acts at discrete time instants solves an impulse control problem. The Hamiltonian Maximum
Principle (see Blaquière (1977a), Blaquière (1977b), Blaquière (1979), Blaquière (1985)) and the Bensoussan-Lions
quasi-variational inequalities (see Bensoussan and Lions (1982), Bensoussan and Lions (1984)) provide a framework
to determine the time and level of such interventions. Recent works that use quasi-variational inequalities (QVI) to
determine the equilibrium in stochastic differential games with impulse control include Cosso (2013), El Asri and
Mazid (2018), Aïd et al. (2019), Ferrari and Koch (2019), and Azimzadeh (2019). In Cosso (2013) and El Asri and
Mazid (2018), both players use impulse controls, and the game is zero-sum. Aïd et al. (2019) consider a two-player
symmetric infinite-horizon nonzero-sum LSDG where both players only use impulse controls. The authors solved QVIs
to analytically characterize the solution and obtained multiple equilibria.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. When the timing of impulses is exogenously given, the open-loop and
feedback Nash equilibria coincide. When the timing of impulses is endogenous, the two equilibria are different. In
the open-loop case, the equilibrium number of impulse is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the
feedback case. For the situations where both the continuous payoff and salvage value of player 2 are either increasing
in state or decreasing in state, we show that there can be at most one impulse in the FNE. We obtain uniqueness of
equilibrium in both the open-loop and feedback cases. Further, we show that the impulse level is a constant in both
equilibria. The equilibrium impulse timing in the feedback case is completely characterized by the problem parameters
of player 2, whereas in open-loop case, the impulse timing also depends on player 1’s problem parameters.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model. In Section 3, we compare the open-loop and
feedback equilibria, assuming that the impulse instants are known a priori while, in Section 4, we characterize the two
equilibria when the impulse instants are endogenous. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section,3 we introduce a scalar deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum linear-state differential game
model, where player 1 uses ordinary controls while player 2 uses impulse controls. Let T <∞ be the duration of the
game. Denote by u(t) ∈ Ωu ⊂ R the control action of player 1 at time t ∈ [0, T ] where Ωu is assumed to be a compact
set. u˜ ∈ U denotes the strategy of player 1 where U := Ωu × [0, T ] is the strategy set of player 1. Player 2 gives an
impulse vi ∈ Ωv ⊂ R at time instant τi ∈ [0, T ] and Ωv is assumed to be a compact set. The strategy of player 2 is
denoted by v˜ = ((v1, τ1), (v2, τ2), ....., (vk, τk)) ∈ V , where V is her strategy set. The number of impulses k is also a
decision variable of player 2. The state trajectory during the non-impulse instants evolves as follows:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), ∀t 6= {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk}. (1)
At the impulse instants, the jump in the state trajectory is given by
x(τ+i )− x(τ−i ) = Qvi, for i = {1, 2, . . . , k}, (2)
where x(τ−i ) = limt↑τi x(t), x(τ
+
i ) = limt↓τi x(t). Clearly, player 1 influences the evolution of state variable during
the non-impulse instants whereas player 2’s control results in the jump in the state variable at the impulse instants.
Player 1 uses strategy u˜ to maximize the objective
J1(x0, u˜, v˜) =
∫ T
0
1
2
(
2w1x(t) +R1u(t)
2
)
dt+
k∑
i=1
q1x(τ
−
i ) + s1x(T ), (3)
and player 2 uses strategy v˜ to maximize the objective
J2(x0, u˜, v˜) =
∫ T
0
w2x(t)dt+
k∑
i=1
(
C +
1
2
P2v
2
i
)
+ s2x(T ), (4)
3We rely heavily on the notations used in Sadana et al. (2019).
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where C < 0 denotes the fixed cost of each impulse and 12P2v
2
i the variable cost of the impulse at time instant τi, with
P2 < 0, and R1 < 0. To simplify the notations, we let τ0 := 0 and τk+1 := T .
Definition 1 The strategy profile (u˜, v˜) is a Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1–4) if the following inequalities
are satisfied:
J1(x0, u˜, v˜) ≥ J1(x0, uˆ, v˜), ∀uˆ ∈ U , (5)
J2(x0, u˜, v˜) ≥ J2(x0, u˜, vˆ), ∀vˆ ∈ V. (6)
In the OLNE (see Sadana et al. (2019)), the players’ strategies depend on time (and on the initial state, which is a given
parameter), while in the feedback information structure, the players’ strategies are functions of state and time; see Bas¸ar
and Olsder (1999).
3 Exogenous impulse instant
In this section, we consider a scalar linear-state differential game instance described by (1–4), where the impulse
instants {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk} are exogenously given. We characterize Nash equilibrium strategies for both open-loop and
feedback information structures. The next theorem characterizes the OLNE of the differential game (1–4). The proof of
this theorem is given in Sadana et al. (2019), and the results are mentioned here for completeness.
Theorem 1 (Exogenous OLNE) If the impulse instants {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk} are given, then the unique OLNE strategies
are given by
u(t) =
B
R1
(w1
A
−
(
λ1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t)
)
,∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, (7a)
vi =
Q
P2
(w2
A
−
(
s2 +
w2
A
)
eA(T−τi)
)
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, (7b)
where
λ1(t) = −w1
A
+
(
λ1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t),∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1), λ1(τk+1) = s1,
λ1(τ
−
i ) = λ1(τ
+
i ) + q1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},
so that, at the impulse instants, we have
λ1(τ
−
i ) = −
w1
A
+
(
λ1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−τi) + q1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Proof. Player 1 solves an optimal control problem, and the necessary conditions for OLNE can be obtained by using
the approach given in Geering (1976). Player 2 solves an impulse control problem with the impulse timing being given,
and the necessary conditions follow from Chahim et al. (2012). Before proceeding further, we define the Hamiltonian
of player 1 as
H1(x, u(t), λ1(t)) := w1x(t) +
1
2
R1u(t)
2 + λ1(t)(Ax(t) +Bu(t)),
and the Hamiltonian, and the impulse Hamiltonian of player 2 (see Chahim et al. (2012)) are given by
H2(x, u(t), λ2(t)) := w2x(t) + λ2(t)(Ax(t) +Bu(t)),
HI2 (x, vi, λ2(τ
+
i )) := C +
1
2
P2v
2
i + λ1(τ
+
i )Qvi,
where λ1(t) and λ2(t) are the costates of player 1 and player 2. The equilibrium control u(t) of player 1 is obtained by
maximizing the Hamiltonian of player 1 with respect to u(t), which gives
u(t) = −Bλ1(t)
R1
. (8)
To obtain the equilibrium control vi of player 2, we maximize the impulse Hamiltonian of player 2 with respect to vi,
which leads to
vi = −Qλ2(τ
+
i )
P2
. (9)
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We can write the necessary conditions for the OLNE as follows:
For t 6∈ {τ1, τ2, ....., τk},
x˙(t) = Ax(t)− B
2
R1
λ1(t), x(0) = x0, (10a)
λ˙1(t) = −Aλ1(t)− w1, λ1(T ) = s1, (10b)
λ˙2(t) = −Aλ2(t)− w2, λ2(T ) = s2. (10c)
For t ∈ {τ1, τ2, ....., τk},
x(τ+i ) = x(τi)−
Q2
P2
λ2(τ
+
i ), (10d)
λ1(τ
−
i ) = λ1(τ
+
i ) + q1, (10e)
λ2(τ
−
i ) = λ2(τ
+
i ). (10f)
From the above equations, we can obtain the expression for λ1(t) and λ2(t) as follows:
λ1(t) = −w1
A
+
(
λ1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t), for t ∈ [τi, τi+1), (11a)
λ2(t) = −w2
A
+
(
s2 +
w2
A
)
eA(T−t), for t ∈ [0, T ]. (11b)
On substituting the expression of λ1(t) and λ2(t) in (8) and (9) respectively, we obtain the analytical characterization
of the equilibrium control of player 1 and player 2.
Using the dynamic programming principle, we can obtain the FNE.
Theorem 2 (Exogenous FNE) If the impulse instants {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk} are given, the unique FNE is given by
u(t) = − B
R1
(
−w1
A
+
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t)
)
,∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, (12a)
vi = − Q
P2
(
−w2
A
+
(
s2 +
w2
A
)
eA(T−τi)
)
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, (12b)
where
m1(t) = −w1
A
+
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t),∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1), m1(τk+1) = s1,
m1(τ
−
i ) = m1(τ
+
i ) + q1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
So, at the impulse instants, we have
m1(τ
−
i ) = −
w1
A
+
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−τi) + q1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 From (7a)–(7b) and (12a)–(12b), we can conclude that the OLNE and FNE coincide when the impulse
instants are exogenously given.
As mentioned in the introduction, in a linear-state differential game, OLNE and FNE coincide when the players use
ordinary controls. The above theorem extends this result to the class of linear-state differential games with one player
using impulse control.
4 Endogenous impulse instant
In this section, we characterize the OLNE and FNE when the impulse instants are determined endogenously.
Assumption 1 We assume that impulse instants are interior, i.e.,
0 < τ1 < τ2 · · · < τk < T.
4
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w2
s2
q1δe
−AT
q1δ
q1δe
−AT
A
q1δ
A
(a) q1 > 0, A > 0
w2
s2
q1δe
−ATq1δ
q1δe
−AT
A
q1δ
A
(b) q1 < 0, A > 0
w2
s2
q1δe
−ATq1δ
q1δe
−AT
A
q1δ
A
(c) q1 > 0, A < 0
w2
s2
q1δe
−AT
q1δ
q1δe
−AT
A
q1δ
A
(d) q1 < 0, A < 0
Figure 1: Variation of the interior impulse regions for the OLNE in the (w2, s2) space with A and q1. Impulse occurs in the shaded
regions.
4.1 Open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE)
In linear-state open-loop differential games with impulse control, Sadana et al. (2019) showed that the equilibrium is
unique and the number of impulses is at most one. The necessary conditions given in Sadana et al. (2019) still hold,
even if there is a fixed cost at the impulse instant.4 Define
δ =
(
P2
R1
)(
B
Q
)2
. (13)
Theorem 3 (Endogenous OLNE) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the number of impulse instants for player
2 is at most one, that is, k ≤ 1, in the unique open-loop equilibrium. Further, when the parameters satisfy either of the
following conditions (see Figure 1)
(a) A > 0, q1 > 0, q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ,
(b) A > 0, q1 < 0, q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT ,
(c) A < 0, q1 > 0, q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT ,
(d) A < 0, q1 < 0, q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ,
then, k = 1. The equilibrium timing and level of impulse are given by
τol = T − 1
A
ln
(
δ
q1
As2 + w2
)
, (14a)
vol =
Qw2
P2A
− B
2q1
AQR1
. (14b)
4In Chahim et al. (2012), the authors approximated the discontinuous cost function by a continuously differentiable cost function
and showed that if the optimal solution of an impulse control problem is unique, it satisfies the necessary conditions obtained by
using the Impulse Control Maximum Principle, even when the cost function is discontinuous.
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The equilibrium control of player 1 is given by
u(t) =
{
B
R1
(
w1
A − (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t)
)
for τol ≤ t ≤ T,
B
R1
(
w1
A − (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t) − q1eA(τol
−−t)
)
for 0 < t ≤ τol−. (14c)
Proof. When player 2 solves her optimal control problem (with player 1’s strategy fixed at her OLNE strategy),
conditions (10a)–(10f) hold true. Besides these, at the impulse instants, the Hamiltonian continuity condition holds
true; see Chahim et al. (2012). This implies that, at the impulse instant τi, we have
H2(x(τ
+
i ), u(τ
+
i ), λ2(τ
+
i )) = H2(x(τ
−
i ), u(τ
−
i ), λ2(τ
−
i )),
w2x(τ
+
i ) + λ2(τ
+
i )(Ax(τ
+
i ) +Bu(τ
+
i )) = w2x(τ
−
i ) + λ2(τ
−
i )(Ax(τ
−
i ) +Bu(τ
−
i )).
Using the conditions, (10d), (10e), (10f), we can rewrite the Hamiltonian continuity condition as
−
(
(w2 +Aλ2(τi))
Q2
P2
− B
2
R1
q1
)
λ2(τi) = 0.
This implies
λ2(τi) =
{
0 if A = 0
B2q1P2−w2Q2R1
R1AQ2
, 0, if A 6= 0.
λ2(τi) = 0 implies vi = 0, so there can be no interior impulse for A = 0 at equilibrium. Since λ2(t) is strictly
monotone in t, we obtain a unique solution:
λ2(τol) =
B2q1P2 − w2Q2R1
R1AQ2
. (15)
From (11b) and (15), we obtain a unique equilibrium impulse instant
τol = T − 1
A
ln
((
B
Q
)2(
P2
R1
)
q1
As2 + w2
)
= T − 1
A
ln
(
δ
q1
As2 + w2
)
, (16)
which is an interior impulse instant if 0 < τol < T. This implies that we must have T − 1A ln
(
δ q1As2+w2
)
> 0 and
1
A ln
(
δ q1As2+w2
)
> 0. So, τol is an interior impulse instant if the conditions listed in (a)–(d) hold true.
(a) A > 0, q1 > 0, q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ.
(b) A > 0, q1 < 0, q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT .
(c) A < 0, q1 > 0, q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT .
(d) A < 0, q1 < 0, q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ.
4.2 Feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE)
Now, we characterize the FNE when player 2 determines both the timing and the level of the impulses. Let
V1 : [0, T ] × R → R be the value function of player 1. Let player 2’s equilibrium strategy be given by
{(τ1, v1), (τ2, v2), . . . , (τk, vk)}. In the impulse-free region [τ+i , τ−i+1), the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation holds true:
−∂V1(t, x)
∂t
= max
u∈Ωu
(
w1x+
1
2
R1u(t)
2 +
(
∂V1
∂x
)
(Ax+Bu(t))
)
.
At the jump instants, {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk}, the value functions are related as follows:
V1(τ
−
i , x(τ
−
i )) = V1(τ
+
i , x(τ
+
i )) + q1x(τ
−
i ). (17)
Given the linear-state structure of the game, we postulate the value function to be linear, that is, V1(t, x) = α1(t)x+
β1(t). The HJB equation is given by
− α˙1(t)x− β˙1(t) = max
u(t)∈Ωu
{w1x+ 1
2
R1u(t)
2 + α1(t)(Ax+Bu(t))}.
6
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Differentiating the right-hand side with respect to u(t) and equating to zero, we get
u(t) = −Bα1(t)
R1
. (18)
Substituting for the above equilibrium control in the HJB equation, we obtain
−α˙1(t)x− β˙1(t) = w1x− B
2α1(t)
2
2R1
+Aα1(t)x.
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients gives
α˙1(t) = −w1 −Aα1(t), α1(T ) = s1, (19a)
β˙1(t) =
B2α1(t)
2
2R1
, β1(T ) = 0. (19b)
From (17), at any impulse instant τi, we have the following relation:
α1(τ
−
i )x(τ
−
i ) + β1(τ
−
i ) = α1(τ
+
i )(x(τ
−
i ) +Qvi) + β1(τ
+
i ) + q1x(τ
−
i ),
which implies
α1(τ
−
i ) = α1(τ
+
i ) + q1, (20a)
β1(τ
−
i ) = β1(τ
+
i ) + α1(τ
+
i )Qvi. (20b)
Consider the impulse control problem of player 2 and let her value function be given by V2(t, x).
Assumption 2 We assume that V2 : [0, T ]× R→ R is continuous and continuously differentiable in its arguments.
Remark 2 Smooth value functions are widely assumed in the optimal control literature. The book Art of Smooth Pasting
provides a heuristic justification of the continuity and differentiability of the value function in optimal stopping-time
problems (Dixit (1993)).
Given the data (t, x), we define the operatorR as follows:
RV2(t, x) := max
v∈Ωv
(
1
2
P2v
2 + C + V2(t, x+Qv)
)
. (21)
We introduce the Hamiltonian functionH2 : [0, T ]× R× R as follows:
H2(x, t, ∂V2
∂x
) = w2x+
∂V2
∂x
(Ax+Bu(t)) . (22)
The impulse control problem of player 2 satisfies the Bensoussan-Lions quasi-variational inequalities (Bensoussan and
Lions (1982), Bensoussan and Lions (1984)), that is,
∂V2
∂t
+H2(t, x, ∂V2
∂x
) ≤ 0, (23a)
V2(t, x)−RV2(t, x) ≥ 0, (23b)(
∂V2
∂t
+H2(t, x, ∂V2
∂x
)
)
(V2(t, x)−RV2(t, x)) = 0, (23c)
V2(T, x(T )) = s2x(T ). (23d)
In the following, we provide a heuristic interpretation of the equilibrium conditions for player 2. When the state is at
a given level x at time t, player 2 can either give an impulse or wait. Suppose that in the time interval [t, t + h], an
impulse does not occur. Since player 2 waits, using the dynamic programming principle, we conclude that the value
function is bounded from below by the sum of the running profit from t to t+ h and the optimal profit from time t+ h
onwards, that is,
V2(t, x) ≥
∫ t+h
t
w2x(s)ds+ V2(t+ h, x(t+ h)).
7
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From Assumption 2 and using a Taylor series expansion of the above expression, and letting h→ 0, we obtain (23a).
Now, if it is optimal for player 2 to give an impulse at time t, then the state jumps from x(t) to x(t) +Qv, such that
V2(t, x) ≥ max
v∈Ωv
(
C +
1
2
P2v
2 + V2(t, x+Qv)
)
=: RV2(t, x).
This verifies (23b). Clearly, at any (t, x), player 2 can either wait, which implies that (23a) holds with equality, or she
can give an impulse so that (23b) holds with equality. This implies that the complementarity condition (23c) holds to
ensure that either (23a) or (23b) holds with equality. From Assumption 1, there can be no impulse at the final time so
the value function is equal to the salvage value at the final time, which justifies condition (23d).
We define the following two sets. The first is a stopping set S, defined as
S := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∣∣V2(t, x) = RV2(t, x)} . (24)
When the pair (t, x) lies in the stopping set, it is optimal for player 2 to give an impulse. The second is a continuation
set C, defined as
C := {(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R∣∣V2(t, x) > RV2(t, x)} . (25)
The continuation set characterizes the impulse-free region in the game. Assuming V2(t, x) = α2(t)x + β2(t), we
computeRV2 as
RV2(t, x) = max
v∈Ωv
{C + 1
2
P2v
2 + α2(t)(x+Qv) + β2(t)}. (26)
In the impulse-free region, (23a) holds with equality. Assuming the value function V2(t, x) = α2(t)x + β2(t), and
using (18) in (23a), we obtain
w2x(t) + α˙2(t)x+ β˙2(t) + α2(t)
(
Ax− B
2α1(t)
R1
)
= 0.
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients gives
α˙2(t) = −w2 −Aα2(t), α2(T ) = s2, (27a)
β˙2(t) =
B2α1(t)α2(t)
R1
, β2(T ) = 0. (27b)
Solving for α2(t), we have
α2(t) =
{
w2(T − t) + s2, A = 0
−w2A + eA(T−t)
(
s2 +
w2
A
)
, A 6= 0
Maximization of the right-hand side of (26) yields
v = −Qα2(t)
P2
. (28)
Substituting back in (26) yields
RV2(t, x) = C − Q
2α2(t)
2P2
+ V2(t, x).
In the stopping set, we have V2(t, x) = RV2(t, x). Using the above equation, we obtain
α22(t) =
2P2C
Q2
. (29)
The stopping set is given by
S :=
{
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R
∣∣∣ α22(t) = 2P2CQ2
}
. (30)
Remark 3 In the linear-state differential games with impulse control, the stopping set is independent of the state of the
system.
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Solving (29), we get that player 2 can give an impulse at time τ1fb = α
−1
2
(√
2P2C
Q2
)
and τ2fb = α
−1
2
(
−
√
2P2C
Q2
)
.
Inserting α2(t) in (28), we get the corresponding impulse levels v1 = − sign(Q)(
√
2C
P2
and v2fb = sign(Q)
√
2C
P2
,
respectively.
Clearly, α2(t) is strictly monotone in t, so it can take values
√
2P2C
Q2 and −
√
2P2C
Q2 at most once. Let γ =
√
2P2C
Q2 . We
obtain two solutions, τ1fb and τ
2
fb, for the impulse instants, which are given by
τ1fb =
{
T − 1w2 (γ − s2) , A = 0
T − 1A ln
(
w2+Aγ
As2+w2
)
, A 6= 0
τ2fb =
{
T + 1w2 (γ + s2) , A = 0
T − 1A ln
(
w2−Aγ
As2+w2
)
, A 6= 0
For τ1fb and τ
2
fb to be interior impulse instants, we must have 0 < τ
1
fb < T and 0 < τ
2
fb < T . In the following discussion,
we study the parameter regions in the (w2, s2) plane that result in zero, one, and two impulse instants.
1. with A = 0: For τ1fb > 0 we require T − 1w2 (γ − s2) > 0; this implies Tw2 + s2 − γ > 0 when w2 > 0,
and Tw2 + s2 − γ < 0 when w2 < 0. So, τ1fb > 0 whenever (Tw2 + s2 − γ)w2 > 0. Next, for τ1fb < T we
require T − 1w2 (γ − s2) < T , and this implies (γ − s2)w2 > 0. Using a similar analysis, we conclude that
τ2fb > 0 whenever (Tw2 + s2 + γ)w2 > 0, and τ
2
fb < T whenever (γ + s2)w2 < 0. Figure 2(a) illustrates in
the (w2, s2) space the parameter regions corresponding to the impulse instants τ1fb and τ
2
fb. Further, when both
τ1fb and τ
2
fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then, whenever w2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ
1
fb < τ
2
fb < T ,
and whenever w2 < 0, we have that 0 < τ2fb < τ
1
fb < T .
2. with A < 0: For τ1fb > 0, we require that T − 1A ln
(
w2+Aγ
As2+w2
)
> 0, which implies (w2 +Aγ)(w2 +
As2) > 0 (for the logarithm to exist), and
(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT −Aγ
)
(w2 + As2) < 0. Next, for
τ1fb < T , we require that 0 <
w2+Aγ
w2+As2
< 1, and this implies (w2 +Aγ)(w2 + As2) > 0 and (γ − s2)(w2 +
As2) > 0. Using a similar analysis, we conclude that τ2fb > 0 whenever (w2 − Aγ)(w2 + As2) > 0 and(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT +Aγ
)
(w2 + As2) < 0. Further, τ2fb < T whenever (w2 − Aγ)(w2 + As2) > 0
and (γ+ s2)(w2 +As2) < 0. Figure 2(b) illustrates in the (w2, s2) space the parameter regions corresponding
to the impulse instants τ1fb and τ
2
fb. Further, when both τ
1
fb and τ
2
fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then
whenever w2 + As2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ1fb < τ
2
fb < T , and whenever w2 + As2 < 0, we have that
0 < τ2fb < τ
1
fb < T .
3. with A > 0: For τ1fb > 0 we require that T − 1A ln
(
w2+Aγ
As2+w2
)
> 0, which implies (w2 +Aγ)(w2 +As2) > 0
(for the logarithm to exist), and
(
w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 −Aγe−AT
)
(w2 +As2) > 0. Next, for τ1fb < T , we
require that w2+Aγw2+As2 > 1, and this implies (γ − s2)(w2 + As2) > 0. Using a similar analysis, we conclude
that τ2fb > 0 whenever (w2 −Aγ)(w2 +As2) > 0 and
(
w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 +Aγe−AT
)
(w2 +As2) > 0.
Further, τ2fb < T whenever (w2−Aγ)(w2 +As2) > 0 and (γ+ s2)(w2 +As2) < 0. Figure 2(c) illustrates in
the (w2, s2) space the parameter regions corresponding to the impulse instants τ1fb and τ
2
fb. Further, when both
τ1fb and τ
2
fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then wheneverw2+As2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ
1
fb < τ
2
fb < T ,
and whenever w2 +As2 < 0, we have that 0 < τ2fb < τ
1
fb < T .
We summarize the above discussion in the next theorem.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then, there can exist at most two interior impulses in the FNE, that
is, k ≤ 2.
• If any of the following conditions hold
(a) with A = 0 : w2 > 0, Tw2 + s2 > γ, s2 < −γ or w2 < 0, Tw2 + s2 < −γ, s2 > γ,
(b) with A < 0 : w2(eAT −1) +As2eAT < Aγ, s2 < −γ or w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 > −Aγe−AT , s2 > γ,
(c) withA > 0 :w2(1−e−AT )+As2 > Aγe−AT , s2 < −γ orw2(1−e−AT )+As2 < −Aγe−AT , s2 > γ,
then there are exactly two interior impulses τ1fb and τ
2
fb with the equilibrium timing and levels given by v
1
fb and
v2fb, respectively.
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s2
w2
γ
−γ
− γT
0 < τ1fb < T
0 < τ1fb < T
0 < τ2fb < T
0 < τ2fb < T
γ
T
(a) A = 0
s2
w2
γ
−Aγ
−γ
Aγ
0 < τ1fb < T
0 < τ1fb < T
0 < τ2fb < T
0 < τ2fb < T
(b) A < 0
s2
w2
γ
Aγ
−γ
−Aγ
0 < τ2fb < T
0 < τ2fb < T
0 < τ1fb < T
0 < τ1fb < T
(c) A > 0
Figure 2: Light and medium-dark shaded regions correspond to parameter values in the (w2, s2) plane that result in one impulse.
Very dark shaded regions correspond to parameter values that result in two impulses.
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• τ1fb is the only interior impulse if the parameters satisfy either of the following conditions:
(a) with A = 0 : (Tw2 + s2 − γ)w2 > 0, Tw2 + s2 > −γ, (γ − s2)w2 > 0, s2 > −γ,
(b) with A < 0 : w2(eAT − 1) + As2eAT < Aγ, −γ < s2 < γ, w2(eAT − 1) + As2eAT < −Aγ or
s2 > γ, w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT > Aγ, w2(eAT − 1) +As2eAT < −Aγ,
(c) with A > 0 : −γ < s2 < γ, w2(1 − e−AT ) + As2 > Aγe−AT , w2(1 − e−AT ) + As2 > −Aγe−AT
or s2 > γ, w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 < Aγe−AT , w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 > −Aγe−AT .
• τ2fb is the only interior impulse if parameters satisfy either of the following conditions:
(a) with A = 0 : (Tw2 + s2 + γ)w2 > 0, Tw2 + s2 < γ, (γ + s2)w2 < 0, s2 < γ,
(b) with A < 0 : w2(eAT − 1) + As2eAT < −Aγ, s2 < −γ, w2(eAT − 1) + As2eAT > Aγ or
−γ < s2 < γ, w2(eAT − 1) +As2eAT > −Aγ, w2(eAT − 1) +As2eAT > Aγ,
(c) with A > 0 : s2 < −γ, w2(1 − e−AT ) + As2 > −Aγe−AT , w2(1 − e−AT ) + As2 < Aγe−AT or
−γ < s2 < γ, w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 < −Aγe−AT , w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 < Aγe−AT .
Remark 4 We have the following observations: (i) The level of impulse is a constant and proportional to the ratio of
fixed cost C to the coefficient of proportional transaction cost P2. Note that P2 can be interpreted as the marginal cost
at zero impulse, i.e.,
∂( 12P2v
2
i )
∂vi
∣∣∣∣
vi=0
. (ii) The timing of an impulse by player 2 is independent of player 1’s parameters.
Indeed, it depends on player 2’s parameter values and the coefficient entering the state dynamics. (iii) From (27b), we
can infer that β2(t) is not differentiable at impulse instants because α1(t) is discontinuous at those instants. Finally,
(iv) when there are two impulses, their levels are negative of each other.
Next, we provide the equilibrium control of player 1 when 0 < τ1fb < τ
2
fb < T and 0 < τ
1
fb < T . For 0 < τ
1
fb < τ
2
fb < T ,
the equilibrium control of player 1 is obtained by first solving for α1(.) from (19a) and (20a),
α1(t) =

−w1A + (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t) for τ2fb
+
< t ≤ T
−w1A + (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t) + q1eA(τ
2
fb−t) for τ1fb
+
< t ≤ τ2fb−
−w1A + (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t) + q1eA(τ
2
fb−t) + q1eA(τ
1
fb−t) for 0 < t ≤ τ1fb−
.
From u(t) = − BR1α1(t), we obtain the equilibrium control of player 1. Similarly, we can determine the equilibrium
control when 0 < τ2fb < τ
1
fb < T . When only impulse τ
1
fb can occur, the equilibrium control of player 1 is given by
u(t) =
{
B
R1
(
w1
A − (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t)
)
for τ1fb
+
< t ≤ T,
B
R1
(
w1
A − (s1 + w1A )eA(T−t) − q1eA(τ
1
fb
−−t)
)
for 0 < t ≤ τ1fb−.
4.3 Comparison of open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria
Comparing the OLNE and FNE shows that when the timing of impulses is a decision variable, we no longer obtain the
result that the two equilibria coincide in a linear-state differential game. This is one of the main takeaways of our paper.
Note, however, that we still have uniqueness of equilibrium in both the open-loop and feedback cases.
Remark 5 It is clear from Theorem 4 that there is exactly one interior impulse in the FNE if both the continuous payoff
and salvage value of player 2 either increase in x or decrease in x, i.e., if w2 > 0, s2 > 0 or w2 < 0, s2 < 0.
We have already determined that with A = 0, there is no interior impulse in the OLNE while there are at most two
interior impulses in the FNE. We are left with studying the equilibrium solutions when A 6= 0.
1. Assume that player 2 incurs a running cost, i.e., w2 < 0, and that the salvage value of player 2 is decreasing in
x, i.e., s2 < 0.
With A > 0, τol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q1 < 0 and q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT (see Figure
1(b)) and in the FNE, τ2fb is the interior impulse if
(
w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 +Aγe−AT
)
< 0 and−γ < s2 hold
(see Figure 2(c)).
With A < 0, τol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q1 > 0 and q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT (see Figure
1(c)), or q1 < 0 and q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ (see Figure 1(d)). For A < 0, τ2fb is the interior impulse
in the FNE if −γ < s2 and
(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT +Aγ
)
> 0, or
(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT +Aγ
)
< 0
and s2 < −γ hold; see Figure 2(b).
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2. Second, we assume that player 2 values the state positively so that w2 > 0 and her salvage value is increasing
in x, i.e., s2 > 0.
With A > 0, τol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q1 > 0 and q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ (see Figure
1(a)), and in the FNE, τ1fb is the interior impulse if
(
w2(1− e−AT ) +As2 −Aγe−AT
)
> 0 and s2 < γ (see
Figure 2(c)).
With A < 0, τol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q1 > 0 and q1δ < As2 + w2 < q1δe−AT (see Figure
1(c)) or q1 < 0 and q1δe−AT < As2 + w2 < q1δ (see Figure 1(d)), and in the FNE, τ1fb is the only interior
impulse if
(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT −Aγ
)
< 0 and s2 < γ, or
(
w2(e
AT − 1) +As2eAT −Aγ
)
> 0 and
s2 > γ (see Figure 2(c)).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we determined open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria in the scalar deterministic finite-horizon two-player
nonzero-sum linear-state differential game with impulse controls, in two cases, namely, when the impulse instants are
given and when player 2 endogenously determines the equilibrium timing of the impulses. We showed that open-loop
and feedback equilibria coincide when the impulse instants are exogenously given, and that they differ when these
instants are endogenously determined.
For future research, it would be interesting to determine the feedback solutions for more general classes of differential
games with impulse controls. A natural first candidate is the class of linear-quadratic differential games, which is often
used in applications. Clearly, there would be computational challenges since the stopping set condition would involve
the state variables that evolve forward in time, while the Ricatti system of players 1 and 2 evolve backwards in time.
Another extension of this work could be to consider the case where both players use continuous as well as impulse
controls.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let V1 : [0, T ]× R→ R be the value function of player 1, with V1(T, x(T )) = s1x(T ). The Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation for player 1 for t ∈ (τ+i , τ−i+1), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} is given by
−∂V1(t, x)
∂t
= max
u∈Ωu
(
w1x+
1
2
R1u(t)
2 +
(
∂V1
∂x
)
(Ax+Bu(t))
)
.
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Given the linear-state structure of the problem, we assume that the value function is linear and given by
V1(t, x) = m1(t)x+ n1(t),
and rewrite the HJB equation as
−m˙1(t)x− n˙1(t) = max
u∈Ωu
(
w1x+
1
2
R1u(t)
2 +m1(t)(Ax+Bu(t))
)
.
Between the impulse instants, the equilibrium control of player 1 can be expressed in terms of the gradient of the value
function of player 1 with respect to x:
u(t) = −Bm1(t)
R1
. (31)
Using the equilibrium control in the HJB equation, we obtain
−m˙1(t)x− n˙1(t) = w1x− B
2m1(t)
2
2R1
+Am1(t)x.
On comparing the coefficients, we have
m˙1(t) = −w1 −Am1(t), m1(T ) = s1, (32a)
n˙1(t) =
B2m1(t)
2
2R1
, n1(T ) = 0. (32b)
At the impulse instants, the value functions are related as follows:
V1(τ
−
i , x(τ
−
i )) = V1(τ
+
i , x(τ
−
i ) +Qvi) + q1x(τ
−
i ),
where vi denotes the equilibrium impulse level by player 2 at the impulse instant τi. Using V1(t, x) = m1(t)x+ n1(t),
we obtain
m1(τ
−
i )x(τ
−
i ) + n1(τ
−
i ) = m1(τ
+
i )x(τ
−
i ) +m1(τ
+
i )Qvi + n1(τ
+
i ) + q1x(τ
−
i ),
which results in the following update equations for the m1(.) and n1(.):
m1(τ
−
i ) = m1(τ
+
i ) + q1, (33a)
n1(τ
−
i ) = n1(τ
+
i ) +m1(τ
+
i )Qvi. (33b)
Let V2 : [0, T ]× R→ R be the value function of player 2 and assume that
V2(t, x) = m2(t)x+ n2(t),
where V2(T, x(T )) = s2x(T ). For the impulse-free region, we have the following relation:
−∂V2(t, x)
∂t
= w2x+
(
∂V2
∂x
)
(Ax+Bu(t)),
which, on substituting the equilibrium control u(t) of player 1, simplifies to
w2x+ m˙2(t)x+ n˙2(t) +m2(t)(Ax− B
2m1(t)
R1
) = 0.
On comparing the above coefficients, we get for t 6= {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk},
m˙2(t) = −w2 −Am2(t), m2(T ) = s2, (34a)
n˙2(t) =
B2m1(t)m2(t)
R1
, n2(T ) = 0. (34b)
At the impulse instants {τ2, τ2, . . . , τk}, the equilibrium value function of player 2 satisfies
V2(τ
−
i , x(τ
−
i )) = max
vi∈Ωv
{
V2(τ
+
i , x(τ
−
i ) +Qvi) +
1
2
P2v
2
i + C
}
. (35)
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The above equation implies that, at the impulse instant, player 2 selects the equilibrium control to maximize the
value-to-go from that instant onwards. The equilibrium impulse level is obtained as follows:
vi = arg max
vi∈Ωv
{
V2(τ
+
i , x(τ
−
i ) +Qvi) +
1
2
P2v
2
i + C
}
= arg max
vi∈Ωv
{
m2(τ
+
i )(x(τ
−
i ) +Qvi) + n2(τ
+
i ) +
1
2
P2v
2
i + C
}
= −m2(τ
+
i )Q
P2
. (36a)
Using vi in (35), we obtain
m2(τ
−
i )x(τ
−
i ) + n2(τ
−
i ) = m2(τ
+
i )x(τ
−
i ) + n2(τ
+
i )−
m2(τ
+
i )
2Q2
2P2
+ C.
The above relation holds for all x. Therefore, we have
m2(τ
−
i ) = m2(τ
+
i ), (37)
n2(τ
−
i ) = n2(τ
+
i )−
m2(τ
+
i )
2Q2
2P2
+ C. (38)
Using (32a), (33a), we obtain
m1(t) = −w1
A
+
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t),∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, (39)
where m1(τ−k+1) = s1, and
m1(τ
−
i ) = −
w1
A
+
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−τi) + q1,∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}.
Similarly, from (34a), (37), we obtain
m2(t) = −w2
A
+
(
s2 +
w1
A
)
eA(T−t),∀t ∈ [0, T ].
From (31) and (36a), the equilibrium controls are obtained as follows:
u(t) =
B
R1
(w1
A
−
(
m1(τ
−
i+1) +
w1
A
)
eA(τi+1−t)
)
,∀t ∈ [τi, τi+1), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
vi =
Q
P2
(w2
A
−
(
s2 +
w2
A
)
eA(T−τi)
)
,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
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